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Washbo1l1'l1e, M.R. (1984) . Age-related about theories of educational administration, and at a level of abstraction which many administrators will find daunting. In describing prevailing controversies over epistemologies in educational administration, the authors present yet another one, namely whether their .. Quinean/holistic point of view can accommodate ethics and a rational knowledge without a foundational justification as flawed as the ones they criticise.
Many of the chapters had appeared in discrete form by the two authors in international journals. They have been pulled together here skilfully and coherently. One cannot dispute the scholarly presentation of material. Educational administrators such as Griffiths, Greenfield, Hodgkinson, Hoy, Willower, Sergiovanni, Kemmis, Bates are discussed in some detail. Because their administrative policies are secondary to a pursuit of their epistemological assumptions, a prior knowledge of their work makes following the argument much easier. Writings from Dewey, Taylor, Simon, Gadamer, Habermas, Giddens, Churchlands provide a broader post-positivistic epistemological context to their argument. The second is a complemelltary diversity thesis which acknowledges that even the incommensurable paradigms used by Kuhn, Newtonian physics and quantum theory, continue to be used side by side in current scientific research.
They are simply acknowledged to be serving different human purposes. This l1let/lOd%gical pluralism allows for appropriate ways of approaching different, or even the same, research problems and supports. Folk theories can coexist happily with metaanalysis and behavioural science regardless of their different epistemological assumptions. The problem of how they can resolve their differences, or even if they need to, is left unanswered. Evers and Lakomski are content to avoid detailed discussion as to how Giddens can maintain the explanation/understanding distinction, for instance, simply referring (p. 225) to an unpublished 1987 paper by Jim Walker. In admitting the problem of unambiguously identifying educational research paradigms, they raise the question of how their own coherent theory can be placed outside a complementary diversity thesis. One of their main problems is the self-reference necessary to pursue a more 35 epistemological argument here. To even describe epistemologies as inadequate on the grounds of foundationalist theory is to be involved in the same sort of contradiction-generating paradox as "This sentence is false", for they must be criticising them from within an epistemology which is open to the same criticism.
Evers and Lakomski argue that the very idea of research paradigms is mistaken and incoherent because it relies on a notion of observational truth, a distinction between paradigms and the 'real' world. For them, shared concepts and justifications, meaning and truth are brought into a productive relation with one another through 'touchstone' -which denies a distinction between rationality and content; good and problemsolving; and ethical and empirical claims. Touchstone is defined (p. 233) as nonfoundationalist because it is merely the shifting and historically explicable amount of theory that is shared by rival theories and theorists. All our beliefs are in principle open to revision not against how they fit "the real world", but how they cohere with all of our other beliefs. This is a holistic theory operating not only according to empirical adequacy, but to principles of consistency, simplicity, comprehensiveness, fecundity, familiarity of principle and explanatory power (p. 229). So when Evers and Lakomski say (p. 213) "We do not need alternatives to science: we need better science", they appear prima facie to have considerably revised the notion of science.
Logically, there need be no retreat to foundationalism. What counts as a better science from a coherentist view? Because it includes values, it shifts the emphasis from truth to evidence.
How do we decide in judging contentious evidence which of the above principles are overriding? Even by including explanatory power, Evers and Lakomski are still begging the question about causal notions versus intentionality. If they allow reasons the same explanatory force as causes, as Davidson does, they might well by-pass it. But they make the mistake of reverting to a Quinean behaviourism, in which the meaning of a statement is still identified with the means of confirming evidence -they remain verificationists. The requirement of touchstone says it must be a theory that works, especially in such problems as getting researchers out of 'real' offices (p. 229). And the theory must not only be one which works but one which is seen to be working, i.e. it is still a behaviouristic view of science because the principles of simplicity and parsimony require us to focus on the relatively superficial aspects of any claim. To remove the 36 distinction between ethical and empirical is in this case to reduce the former to the Like Ted Trainer (1991) they reduce concepts or principles to their prudential value how they work in a shared world of action. Evers and Lakomski admit they reductionist, but they do not use the 'behaviourist', because that might suspiciously like a foundationalist Quine (1990, pp. 37-8 We really want to discard the use of the word 'true' (p. 227), then we have to acknowledge that touchstone really must be more than the behaviourist/materialist agenda Evers and Lakomski have for it. The hermeneuticists who believe that meaning is meta-empirical may not be incommensurable with behaviourists, but merely assign less importance to emp~rical science within their epistemology. In placmg a higher priority on meta-empirical matters, they are merely redefining their touchstone to include 16, No. 2,1991 Australiall Jourllal of Teacher Edllcatioll feelings, intentions, desires, understandings as a valuable component of knowing.
I want mind and matter to be held in equal regard.
by educational administrators and believe they can do this within a coherent unity theory even If they have to concede that our conceptual construction and speculative interpretation is dependent upon and constructed fron;t within a sensed world. To accept Churchlands' argument (1990, p. 87 ) that "it goes against modem psychological evidence that one's introspective judgements are on all fOI!rs with percep~u~l judgements generally, and proVide knowledge that IS III 110 way distinguished by any special status, purity or authority" is simply to beg the question as to the priority of psychological research. Poets and artists may have as much social efficacy and certainly provide as much meaning. I believe (with the poets and artists) in an indubitable awareness of an individual self which can guide actions with as much force as external causes, and becomes more than a Churchlandish neural network. It uses imagination as well as logic to draw meaningful associations between theories, people, situations and experiences. Because we are working with people, and know our intentions in dealing with them, our construction of them as persons rather than historical bundles of acquired habits, we as educational administrators have to question further the arguments underlying the Evers and Lakomski behaviourist epistemology.
I can accept the need for a coherentist theory without the Quinean materialism. I am probably happier with the Davidsonian/Dennett holistic theory (more compatible with Greenfield and Sergiovanni) which begins in our sensed world and constructs a more human shared reality from that. Ironically, even though Churchland believes that a completed neuroscience will embody the essential wisdom about our inner nature, he leaves space in his final chapter to allow for the value of introspective consciousness, even if it becomes little more than awareness of glucose consumption in the fore-brain, dopamine levels in the thalamus and so on. Self-awareness is something Evers and Lakomski say little about and the phenomenologists place a priority on. My postgraduate courses on ethics in educational administration have provided some evidence for believing that one of the important ways of knowing educational administration is precisely a reflection which creates self-awareness in the educational administrator to think about his/her own sets of values, and her/his reasons for holding them as well as testing those assumptions against the "real world" schools. Ironically, though its language and erudition make it difficult to access, this book could well be used to generate such reflection. There should be more room within the coherent theory to allow for further debate between the humanists and the materialists.
END NOTE 1. For instance, see my article "On equitable cakecutting" (Haynes, 1989) where I argue that Dawkins presents a case for funding more women in maths and science on the grounds of equity, but does not argue for more men in arts and education because he "sees" the problem of equity I equality through a lens of national productivity rather than personal rights. The book is both a biography and a history of the origins of examinations. It traces the major events in the life of J ames Booth, an energetic Irishman, who was foremost in setting in motion the process whereby examinations formed a critical role in English education. Foden devotes separate chapters to the various stages of the life of Booth and intertwines the history of the origin of public examinations conducted by the Society of Arts around his central character. The chapter headings illustrate this intermingling of biography and examination history. The first four chapters are biographical with titles such as Trinity Graduate, Irish Emigrant; Mathematician, Teacher; Priest and Industrial Educator followed by six chapters on the history of the origins of examinations. The final two chapters complete the biography of Booth.
The book should be required reading for those interested in the history of assessment. It has many features that recommend it to educational and social historians.
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